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ONLINE DEFAMATION RECOURSE
by
Bradford H. Buck*
I.

INTRODUCTION
This article discusses the law of defamation (particularly the
form of written defamation known as libel), the various types
of online sites where libel could occur and the available
recourse or remedies for the person who was libeled online.

II.

THE LAW OF DEFAMATION

The Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 558 provides the
following elements for defamation: “to create liability for
defamation there must be:
(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning
another;
(b) an unprivileged publication to a third party;
(c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of
the publisher; and
_________________________________________________
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(d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of
special harm or the existence of special harm caused by
the publication.” 1.
The first element of defamation requires the that the
statement must be a statement of fact and not opinion. It can be
very difficult to sort out whether a statement is a statement of
fact or opinion. “In determining whether a statement is merely
an opinion and thus not subject to a cause of action for
defamation as a matter of law, courts must take several
considerations into account: "whether the statement has a
precise and readily understood meaning; whether the statement
is verifiable; and whether the statement's literary or social
context signals that it has factual content."” 2
The second element of defamation is publication to a
third party. In the internet context, this is usually not a problem
since the statement is typically published to at least one third
person or available for anyone on the internet to see.
The third element of defamation involves the degree of
liability. The notes for the Restatement (Second) of Torts
Section 558 provides that this was added as a result of the US
Supreme Court’s constitutional decisions. 3 The most famous
case is New York Times Co. v Sullivan. 4 In that case, the US
Supreme Court held that in defamation actions by a public
official, more than negligence is required and the plaintiff must
prove actual malice which is that the statement was made with
knowledge it is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not. 5 Subsequently, the US Supreme Court extended this
protection to “public figures”. 6 In addition, there may be public
figures for all purposes or public figures for a limited range of
issues such a particular newsworthy event.
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The fourth requirement element of defamation involves
whether damage was proved or is assumed. There are two kinds
of defamation: defamation per se; and defamation per quod. “A
statement is defamatory per se if the resulting harm is apparent
and obvious on the face of the statement ….If a statement is
defamatory per se, the plaintiff is not required to plead actual
damage to his reputation ….but, rather, the statement is
considered to be so obviously and materially harmful that injury
to the plaintiff's reputation is presumed. …. There are five
categories of statements that are deemed to be defamation per
se: (1) words imputing the commission of a criminal offense; (2)
words that impute infections with a loathsome communicable
disease; (3) words that impute an individual is unable to perform
his employment duties or otherwise lacks integrity in performing
those duties; (4) words that prejudice an individual in his
profession or otherwise impute a lack of ability in his profession;
and (5) words that impute an individual has engaged in
fornication or adultery.” 7 “Statements are defamatory per quod
where either: (1) the statement's defamatory character is not
apparent on its face so that examining extrinsic circumstances is
necessary to show its injurious meaning; or (2) the statement is
defamatory on its face but does not fall within the enumerated
categories of per se actions. Prejudice is not presumed, however,
and the plaintiff must plead special damages.” 8 If a statement is
not defamatory per se, it is defamatory per quod and the plaintiff
must prove actual monetary damages.
The last item to mention is the category of the party
who disseminated the defamation. Common law distinguished
among three different types of liability regarding defamation:
publisher liability, distributor liability, and common carrier
liability. “Publishers generally experience the greatest amount
of liability, while common carriers experience the least.
Publisher liability may be attributed to any entity that exercises
a high degree of editorial content control over the dissemination
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of defamatory material. …Distributor liability may be attributed
to any entity that distributes, but does not exercise editorial
control over, defamatory material, such as a news vendor,
bookstore, or library. A distributor can be characterized as an
entity that transmits or delivers information that is created or
published by a third party. Distributors are only held liable if
they knew or had reason to know of the defamation. Lastly,
common carrier liability applies to any entity that acts as a
passive conduit for the transmission of defamatory material.
Thus, even if it knew or had reason to know of the defamation,
it may escape liability for defamation due to its lack of editorial
control over the material.” 9

III.

DIFFERENT TYPES OF INTERNET
COMMUNICATION

There are many ways in which a person could be defamed
in internet communications. Email is the first of those ways. A
party would access his or her email through an internet service
provider (“ISP”). An email would be sent to at least one other
person. In addition, copies of the email could be sent to one or
more than one other persons. All these communications should
have at least the email address of the sender.
Instant messaging (“IM”) is another mode of internet
communication. This is similar to an email. Again, the party
sending the IM would access go through an ISP or similar
carrier. Typically, there may not another person copied on the
IM. As with an email, there should be some number identifying
the sender.
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The third mode of internet communication is a blog,
chatroom or forum. Typically, a party would access these
forums through an ISP. However, there usually is another party
involved in setting up the blog, chatroom or forum. Anyone
can contribute to these sites gaining access to them though an
ISP. Anyone having access to the blog, chatroom or forum can
see the defamatory communication. Many parties may use
another name and it may be difficult for anyone reading these
comments to identify the contributor without obtaining
information from the provider.
Another way to communicate via the internet is
through social media. This category has sites such as
Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, LinkedIn and even other rating
sites such as Yelp. Just like the previous category, usually
someone is the provider and an individual then contributes
comments to locations on the site gaining access through an
ISP. Some of these such as Facebook and LinkedIn, may
identify the person making a communication. Others, such as
Yelp, may be like the previous category and it may be hard to
identify the contributor.
Lastly, a party may find many sites on the internet by
using search engine. There are many search engines such as
Google and Bing. These search engines list various sites
resulting from the search. There usually are excerpts taken
from each actual site listed in the search results. A party would
access a search engine through an ISP.
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IV.

THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT AND
INTERNET PUBLISHERS AND DISTRIBUTORS

Section 230(c) of the Communications Decency Act of
1996 10 (“CDA”) provides as follows:
“(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker. No provider or user of
an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher
or speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider.
(2) Civil liability. No provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be held liable on account of—
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access
to or availability of material that the provider or user considers
to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent,
harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such
material is constitutionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information
content providers or others the technical means to restrict
access to material described in paragraph (1) [subparagraph
(A)].”
Section 230(f) of the CDA provides the following key
definitions:
“(2) Interactive computer service. The term “interactive
computer service” means any information service, system, or
access software provider that provides or enables computer
access by multiple users to a computer server, including
specifically a service or system that provides access to the
Internet and such systems operated or services offered by
libraries or educational institutions.
(3) Information content provider. The term “information
content provider” means any person or entity that is
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
development of information provided through the Internet or
any other interactive computer service.”
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The first quoted subsection of 230(c) above provides that a
provider or user is not considered to be a publisher for content
provided by an information content provider. The second
subsection of Section 230(c) above provides that no provider or
user of an interactive computer service is liable for restricting
access to certain content the provider or user considers
objectionable.
There have been numerous actions brought against
providers or platforms for online defamation. Many of the
providers or platforms who have been sued have raised the
defense that Section 230 of the CDA makes them immune from
any liability. One of the most famous and early cases was the
case of Zeran v America Online 11. The plaintiff Zeran was the
victim of a vicious online prank. An unknown person put
Zeran’s name and telephone number in several notices on the
electronic bulletin board of the defendant, America Online
(“AOL”) advertising T-shirts with slogans glorifying the
bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City. After these
were posted, Zeran received numerous troubling and
threatening telephone calls. Zeran notified AOL of these posts
and demanded their removal. After AOL removed the first
posts, other similar posts again appeared, and the process of
notice and eventual removal again occurred. Zeran sued AOL
claiming AOL was negligent for allowing these notices to
remain and reappear. Specifically, Zeran claimed AOL was the
distributor of the defamatory material and while publishers are
immune under Section 230 of the CDA, distributors are not.
The court held that Section 230 of the CDA preempted state
law, a distributor is merely a subset of a publisher under that
statute and AOL was immune from suit.
Other cases have also held that internet publishers and
distributors are not liable. In Schneider v Amazon.com, Inc. 12,
the plaintiff sued Amazon.com for alleged defamatory
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comments posted about the plaintiff’s book on Amazon’s
website. The court held that to have Section 230 immunity, the
following three elements are required: the defendant must be a
provider or user of an “interactive computer service”; the
asserted claims must treat the defendant as the publisher or
speaker; and the information must be provided by another
“information content provider”. 13 If the defendant was the
information content provider, then the defendant would not be
immune and would be held liable. The court found all three
elements were present in that case so Amazon was not liable.
AOL was again sued in Blumenthal v Drudge 14. The
Drudge Report, hosted on AOL’s website, had alleged
defamatory statements about the plaintiff. Even though AOL
had given Drudge a license agreement and even though under
that license agreement, AOL could remove content that
violated AOL’s terms of service, the court held that AOL was a
publisher, was not the information content provider and
therefore was not liable. In yet another case against AOL 15, the
court held AOL was not an information content provider for
stock quotation information provided by two third parties even
though AOL deleted some of the stock symbols.
In Reit v Yelp!, Inc.16, the plaintiff dentist contacted the
defendant Yelp to remove a derogatory post about the
plaintiff’s dental practice. After that contact, the plaintiff
alleged that Yelp removed all 10 positive reviews and retained
only the negative posting. The court held that if even Yelp’s
action was true, it did not make Yelp the information content
provider and Yelp was immune under Section 230.
In Klayman v Zuckerberg 17, the alleged defamatory material
was an anti-Semitic post on Facebook. The plaintiff demanded
that Facebook remove the page from Facebook which it
eventually did. The plaintiff claimed Facebook’s conduct did
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not arise from its being a publisher but rather from Facebook’s
contractual obligations in its Statement of Rights and
Responsibilities. The court held that under Section 230,
Facebook and its founder Mark Zuckerberg were immune.
As a result of Section 230 of the Communications Decency
Act as interpreted by all these cases, providers or platforms are
not liable for defamatory posts unless the platform itself
created the content. It does not matter whether these platforms
are publishers or distributors. Therefore, there is a difference
between merely hosting a platform and providing content on
that platform. Of course, the providers and platforms are
known and are the deep pockets to sue for any online
defamation. The internet service providers themselves are not
liable either.
There are a few cases which hold that Section 230 did not
bar recovery where the providers did contribute to the
questionable content. In Carafano v Metrosplash, Inc. 18, the
defendant was an information service that provided or enabled
computer access by multiple users to a computer server.
Through the internet, thousands of members were able to
access and use a searchable database maintained on the
service's computer servers. The court held that the service was
also an "information content provider," as users of the service's
website did not simply post whatever information they desired,
but a profile was created from questions asked by the service
and the answers provided and therefore, the service was not
immune under Section 230. In Hy Cite Corp. v
Badbusinessbureau 19, the defendant’s operators' website
allowed users to post and view complaints, so-called "rip-offreports," about businesses. The plaintiff, among other things,
alleged that the website included 35 reports involving its
business and those reports contained false and defamatory
statements. Among other things, the court held that the
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operators were not entitled to immunity under Section 230 of
the Communications Decency Act because the manufacturer's
allegations (that the operators produced original content
contained in the ripoff reports and solicited individuals to
submit reports with the promise that they might ultimately be
compensated) were sufficient to support a finding that the
operators created or developed the wrongful content.

V.

OTHER RECOURSE FOR ONLINE DEFAMATION
If the party defamed online cannot sue the provider or
platform for the defamatory material, what other remedies does
the party have?
Unmasking the Identity of an Anonymous Online Defamer
A party who is defamed has the right to sue the party
who posted the defamatory material. With some forms of
online communication (such as email, instant messaging, posts
on a known person’s Facebook page and tweets by a known
person) the identity of the party who made the defamatory
statement might be known or could be easily identified.
However, the identity of a party posting defamatory material
on blogs, chatrooms, forums, ratings sites and some social
media may not be known. So how does the defamed party find
out the identity of the party who posted the defamatory
content? Usually, the ISP or the platform that hosted these
vehicles probably has some information or can easily find out
information about the identity of the defamer.
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In the appellate case of John Doe No.1 v Cahill20, the
allegedly defamed party sought to obtain the identity of the
defamer from the ISP. The appellant (the alleged defamer) ,
using an alias, had posted two statements on an internet website
sponsored by a news agency stating the appellee councilman
(the alleged defamed party) was paranoid, full of character flaws
and had mental deterioration. The appellee obtained an order
requiring the ISP, Comcast, to disclose the identity of the
appellant. The appellant appealed from the lower court order.
The Supreme Court of Delaware looked at the appropriate
standard of proof required in a motion to dismiss the case
considering the First Amendment right to speak anonymously.
The court adopted the standard of the New Jersey appellate court
in Dendrite Intl., Inc. v Doe21. The court in Dendrite put forth a
test that had four parts requiring the party seeking disclosure:
“(1) to undertake efforts to notify the anonymous poster that he
is the subject of a subpoena or application for an order of
disclosure, and to withhold action to afford the anonymous
defendant a reasonable opportunity to file and serve opposition
to the application. In the internet context, the plaintiff's efforts
should include posting a message of notification of the discovery
request to the anonymous defendant on the same message board
as the original allegedly defamatory posting; (2) to set forth the
exact statements purportedly made by the anonymous poster that
the plaintiff alleges constitute defamatory speech; and (3) to
satisfy the prima facie or "summary judgment standard." 22 After
the court concluded a plaintiff has presented a prima facie cause
of action, the court must “(4) balance the defendant’s First
Amendment right of anonymous free speech against the strength
of the prima facie case presented and the necessity for the
disclosure of the anonymous defendant's identity in determining
whether to allow the plaintiff to properly proceed.” 23 The court
in Cahill held that the second and fourth prongs of the Dendrite
test were not necessary. Since prong number 1 had occurred, the
court looked at prong three of the Dendrite test. The court held
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that under the summary judgement standard, no reasonable
person would believe the appellant’s statements had stated facts
about the appellee.
The Maryland Court of Appeals in the case of
Independent Newspapers, Inc. v Brodie 24 applied the Dendrite
and Cahill standards as well as discussing two other cases with
different standards. The first other case mentioned in Brodie was
Columbia Insurance Company v Seecandy.com 25, which had the
following test: “First, the plaintiff should identify the missing
party with sufficient specificity such that the Court can
determine that defendant is a real person or entity who could be
sued in federal court. This requirement is necessary to ensure
that federal requirements of jurisdiction and justiciability can be
satisfied. Second, the party should identify all previous steps
taken to locate the elusive defendant. This element is aimed at
ensuring that plaintiffs make a good faith effort to comply with
the requirements of service of process and specifically
identifying defendants. Third, plaintiff should establish to the
Court's satisfaction that plaintiff's suit against defendant could
withstand a motion to dismiss. A conclusory pleading will never
be enough to satisfy this element. Pre-service discovery is akin
to the process used during criminal investigations to obtain
warrants. The requirement that the government show probable
cause is, in part, a protection against the misuse of ex parte
procedures to invade the privacy of one who has done no wrong.
A similar requirement is necessary here to prevent abuse of this
extraordinary application of the discovery process and to ensure
that plaintiff has standing to pursue an action against defendant.
Lastly, the plaintiff should file a request for discovery with the
Court, along with a statement of reasons justifying the specific
discovery requested as well as identification of a limited number
of persons or entities on whom discovery process might be
served and for which there is a reasonable likelihood that the
discovery process will lead to identifying information about
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defendant that would make service of process possible.” 26 Also,
the second other case mentioned in Brodie was In Re Subpoena
Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc. 27, where the Circuit Court
of Virginia court put forth the lowest standard which only
required that the party seeking the identity have a good faith
basis for asserting a cause of action before permitting discovery
of identifying information. The court in Brodie ended up
adopting the Dendrite standard and ordered the lower court to
grant the protective order/motion to quash preventing disclosure
of the identifying information.
The Illinois Appellate Court in Maxon v Ottawa Publishing
Company 28 , discussed Dendrite and Cahill but came to a
different result. In Illinois, Supreme Court Rule 224 provides
how a party can determine the identity of a party they may have
a claim against. That Rule provides as follows: “(i) a person or
entity who wishes to engage in discovery for the sole purpose of
ascertaining the identity of one who may be responsible in
damages may file an independent action for such discovery. (ii)
The action for discovery shall be initiated by the filing of a
verified petition in the circuit court of the county in which the
action or proceeding might be brought or in which one or more
of the persons or entities from whom discovery is sought resides.
The petition shall set forth: (A) the reason the proposed
discovery is necessary and (B) the nature of the discovery sought
and shall ask for an order authorizing the petitioner to obtain
such discovery. The order allowing the petition will limit
discovery to the identification of responsible persons.” 29 The
court held that this rule provided the appropriate standard and
granted the petition for disclosure.
The Virginia Court of Appeals in Yelp, Inc. v Hadeed Carpet
Cleaning, Inc. 30 stated that a Virginia has a statute which
provides an unmasking standard. That statute provides as
follows: “At least thirty days prior to the date on which
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disclosure is sought, a party seeking information identifying an
anonymous communicator shall file with the appropriate circuit
court a complete copy of the subpoena and all items annexed or
incorporated therein, along with supporting material showing: a.
That one or more communications that are or may be tortious or
illegal have been made by the anonymous communicator, or that
the party requesting the subpoena has a legitimate, good faith
basis to contend that such party is the victim of conduct
actionable in the jurisdiction where the suit was filed. A copy of
the communications that are the subject of the action or
subpoena shall be submitted. b. That other reasonable efforts to
identify the anonymous communicator have proven fruitless. c.
That the identity of the anonymous communicator …. is ….
needed to advance the claim, relates to a core claim or defense,
or is directly and materially relevant to that claim or defense. d.
That no motion to dismiss, motion for judgment on the
pleadings, or judgment as a matter of law, demurrer or summary
judgment-type motion challenging the viability of the lawsuit of
the underlying plaintiff is pending. The pendency of such a
motion may be considered by the court in determining whether
to enforce, suspend or strike the proposed disclosure obligation
under the subpoena. e. That the individuals or entities to whom
the subpoena is addressed are likely to have responsive
information.” 31 In that case, the appellate court stated there are
at least nine standards for unmasking not including the standard
in Virginia and including Columbia Insurance, Cahill, Brodie
and Dendrite. The appellate court also upheld the order of the
trial court enforcing a subpoena on Yelp to disclose the
identifying information.
In summary, trying to find out the identity of the defamer
from ISP’s, platforms or providers will depend upon the state in
which the party is filing the proceeding. Some states require a
much more substantial showing than the other states.
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Possible Actions Against the Provider

It is noteworthy that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 32
does require that if providers or platforms receive a notice from
a third party that a user has infringed on its intellectual property,
the provider or platform must take action leading to the ultimate
removal of the infringing material. Many of the terms and
conditions of providers or platforms allow a request to take
down material or give the provider or platform the right to
remove material that the provider or platform consider to be
objectionable. Facebook’s terms of service more or less provide
a user with the ability to notify Facebook of defamatory material
and certainly give Facebook the right to remove objectionable
material. 33 If a victim makes such a request of the provider or
platform, the provider or platform may agree to remove the
defamatory content. However, even if the defamatory post is
removed from the site where it appeared, the defamatory post
may still show up in internet searches using a search engine. To
remove the defamatory material completely, the victim would
need to get the search engines, such as Google or Bing, to
remove it as well. This could be extremely difficult.
The case of Barnes v Yahoo!, Inc. 34 provides a possible
recourse concerning a provider’s agreement to remove
objectionable content and the failure to do so. In that case, a
former boyfriend of the plaintiff posted nude photographs and
other sexually explicit content on Yahoo. The plaintiff requested
Yahoo to remove the content, Yahoo agreed but did not do so.
The plaintiff sued Yahoo alleging negligence and promissory
estoppel. The court concluded that Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act barred the negligence claim but
did not bar the promissory estoppel claim. So, such a claim is a
possible recourse against a provider or platform if a defamed
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party requests removal, the provider or platform agrees and fails
to do so.

Possible Actions Against the Defamer

Some businesses have used a way to combat negative online
comments using anti-disparagement clauses in their online
agreements. “At present, the agreements take two forms…. In
the first format, the customer agrees to a contract that prohibits
[the customer] …. from making or posting any negative
remarks, criticisms, or comments about a business, its goods or
services. The second anti-disparagement clause involves
transferring copyright ownership of any online review from the
customer to the business.” 35 Once this copyright ownership is
transferred, the business can demand removal under the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act noted above.
The case of Palmer v Klearegear.com 36 involved the use of
such a disparagement clause. The customer made statements
about the defendant’s poor-quality customer service practices.
The defendant levied a $3,500 fine against the plaintiff. When
the plaintiff did not pay the fine, the defendant reported the
unpaid fine to the credit bureau. The court found that this clause
was unenforceable. Pursuant to the federal Consumer Review
Fairness Act 37 and many state laws, including California 38, these
clauses are unenforceable.
Another possible course of action is to respond to the content
directly. A victim should carefully consider this option. The
victim may end up in an online war with the perpetrator. Also,
this action could further highlight the defamatory post.
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CONCLUSION

Before the advent of the internet, the possibilities of being
defamed occurred primarily in print media such as newspapers
or magazines, but there were some journalistic standards
exercised by the publishers. Now, there are much greater
possibilities of being defamed online and there are fewer, if
any, journalistic standards.
There are challenges with legal recourse for online
defamation. The providers and platforms are mostly immune.
Also, it may be difficult to unmask the identity of anonymous
defamers through the providers or the ISP. Even if the
defamatory content is removed, there still may be references to
that content in searches performed by search engines. It is
difficult to get those search engines to remove any reference to
the content also. Other remedies such as the use of antidisparagement clauses by online businesses are unenforceable.
Even if the defamers are identified and not immune, there can
be difficulties proving the required elements of a defamation
case. A comment could be deemed to be an unactionable
opinion or the defamed party could be a limited public figure
and would therefore have to show malice. Also, even if those
defamers are unmasked, they may not have sufficient assets to
satisfy any judgement.
The best possible outcome would be to amend the
Communications Decency Act to have a similar notice and
removal provision as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
Many authors have advocated that very change 39. While the
providers cannot be expected to police every posting on their
sites, this notice and removal procedure would take into
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account the logistical dilemma of the providers while giving
some recourse to the defamed parties as well.

1

Restatement (Second) of Torts, §558 (Am. Law Inst. 1977).
Maxon v Ottawa Publishing, 402 Ill. App. 3d 704, 929 N.E. 2d 666, 2010
Ill. App. LEXIS 505 (2010).
3
See Restatement, supra note 1 at reporter’s notes.
4
New York Times v Sullivan, 476 U.S. 254 (1964)
5
Id at 279-280.
6
Gertz v Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
7
Stone v Paddock, 961 N.E. 2d 380, 391, 2011 Ill. App. LEXIS 1181
(2011).
8
Id at 393.
9
Sewali K. Patel, Note: Immunizing Internet Service Providers from ThirdParty Internet Defamation Claims: How Far Should Courts Go?55 Vand.
L. Rev. 647, 651 (2002).
10
47 USC Section 230 (2020).
11
Zeran v America Online, 958 F. Supp. 1124 (E.D. Va., 1997).
12
Schneider v Amazon.com, Inc., 108 Wn. App. 454, 31 P.3d 37, 2001
Wash. App. LEXIS 2086 (2001).
13
Id at 460.
14
Blumenthal v Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.C., 1998).
15
Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v America Online, Inc., 206 F. 3d 980 (10th
Cir., 2000).
16
Reit v Yelp!, Inc., 29 Misc. 3d 713, 907 N.Y.S 2d 411, 2010 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 4259 (2010).
17
Klayman v Zuckerberg, 753 F. 3d 1354 (2014).
18
Carafano v Metrosplash, Inc., 339 F., 3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002).
19
Hy Cite, Corp. v Badbusinessbureau, 418 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (D. Az.,
2005).
20
John Doe No. 1 v Cahill, 884 A. 2d 451, 2005 Del. LEXIS 381 (2005).
21
Dendrite Intl., Inc. v Doe No. 3, 342 N.J. Super. 134, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
22
John Doe No. 1, supra at 460.
23
Id.
24
Independent Newspapers, Inc. v Brodie, 407 Md. 415, 966 A.2d 432,
2009 Md. LEXIS 18 (2009).
25
Columbia Insurance Company v Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D.
Cal. 1999).
2

2021 / Online Defamation Recourse / 19

26

Id at 578-580.
In Re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26
(2000).
28
Maxon v Ottawa Publishing Company, supra at note 2.
29
Id at 710.
30
Yelp, Inc. v Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, Inc., 62 Va. App. 678, 752 S.E. 2d
554, 2014 Va. App. LEXIS 1 (2014).
31
Id at 698.
32
17 U.S.C. Section 512 (2020).
33
Facebook Terms of Service, https://www.facebook.com/terms.php (last
visited July 15, 2020).
34
Barnes v Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2008).
35
Ryan Garcia & Thaddeus Hoffmeister, Social Media Law in a Nutshell,
(2017).
36
Palmer v Kleargear.com, no 13-cv-00175 (D. Utah filed Dec. 18, 2013).
37
15 U.S.C.. 45b (2020).
38
California Civil Code § 1670.8 (2014).
39
Ryan King, Online Defamation: Bringing the Communications Decency
Act of 1996 in Line with Sound Public Policy, 2003 Duke L. & Tech. Rev.
Volume: 2, Issue:1, pages 1-11.
27

